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Abstract 
The desire of both the Biafran regime an the federal military government of  Nigeria during the Nigerian civil 
war to secure diplomatic support as well as military assistance from the  outside world could not but lead to the 
internationalization of the conflict. This desire coupled with other reasons attracted many countries to declare 
support and assistance to either the federal military government of Nigeria or the Biafran regime. 
The focus of this paper is to give a historical analysis of the intervention of Britain and Russia during the 
Nigerian civil war. The motivational bases of their involvement in the war, the dynamics and levels of their 
involvement as well as the effects of such involvement shall be examined in this paper. The paper also argues in 
the conclusion that the refusal of Britain and Russia to comply with the call for international arms embargo in 
1968 did not help in facilitating a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The paper also recommends as championed 
by scholars of conflict resolution in a civil war situation that there should be readiness by the intervening powers 
to stop arms sale when it might be effective to aid peaceful resolution of conflict.  
Keywords: Historicizing, intervention, civil war, diplomatic support, military assistance.  
 
1. Introduction   
It is not unreasonable to briefly illuminate Nigeria’s external relations with these powers (Britain and Russia) 
before the outbreak of the war so as to provide some understanding of subsequent developments. At 
independence, Nigeria in line with most developing countries of the world embarked upon a policy of non – 
alignment. The policy of non-alignment as practised by Nigeria and other non- aligned members can be 
understood from two perspectives. The first was to avoid political entanglement in the “Cold war”. For instance, 
during issues involving the superpowers, the stand of Nigeria should be judged not by any obligation to either of 
the parties, but in the light of the merits or its implications on the international community. This stand was taken 
in order to resist external neo – colonial intervention in the internal affairs of Nigeria, as well as to give Nigeria 
the confidence to express its views on certain international issues. Furthermore, non – alignment made possible 
the diversification of sources of financial assistance. (Anglin, 1964).    
In practice, the Nigerian policy of non – alignment was in line with the policies and aspirations of the 
western industrialised countries. Because of Nigeria’s historical evolution, post independence era was highly 
committed towards establishing firm relations with Britain and its western allies. Before the civil war, in terms of 
aid received from foreign countries, it has been asserted that virtually all aids received were directly from 
western sources, especially Britain and the U.S.A or indirectly through the World Bank and the United Nations 
(Ate, 1980). During the same period, the Nigerian government “rejected from the Soviet Union a soft loan of £20 
million (about N40 million) at two percent (2%) interest as against 2.8% from the western countries 
(Adegbonmire, 1970). 
In terms of investment, Anglin (1964) explains that while “eighty percent (80%) of the £200 million in 
overseas investments in Nigeria was British the balance, apart from some Lebanese and Indian Capital, is also 
western”. The figure for the Soviet bloc was nil. 
This strong sentiment in favour of the western countries was reinforced by the military factor. 
Indigenous officers of the army, air force and the police force were products of institutions like the Mons officer 
Cadet School, Aldershot, Sandhurst, Warminster, Scotland yard and others all in Britain. Britain and the United 
States also supplied the equipment for the navy and the army. This situation reached a climax with the signing of 
the Anglo-Nigerian Defence pact. Under this agreement, the Nigerian government was to make staging and 
tropicalization facilities available for the British government. In view of the fact that Britain is a member of 
NATO, the threat posed to Nigeria’s international image engendered stout opposition from various members of 
the country especially students of the university College, Ibadan, and the members of opposition in government, 
which forced the Federal Government to abrogate the agreement in January, 1962. According to Ajibola (1978), 
despite the abrogation of the treaty, the spirit of the pact still lingered on as Britain continued to train most of 
Nigeria’s military personnel, and until 1964, the commanders of the Navy and Army were British nationals. In 
the cultural and education sphere, Britain remains the most important external factor in Nigeria. English is the 
official language of the country and the educational institutions still exhibit traits of British influence. Britain 
remained the major overseas centre of learning for Nigerians. In contrast to this situation, Russian literature was 
banned in Nigeria by the Balewa regime. (Ajibola,1978). 
Thus, it is clearly evident from the above survey that in the field of international polities in general, 
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Nigerian relations with the West particularly Britain were very cordial. While Russia virtually had no foothold in 
Nigeria. It is against such a background that the roles of the Great Powers particularly Britain and Russia, during 
the Nigerian civil war shall be examined. 
 
2. The concept of Intervention in International Relations 
There are problems involved in conflict resolution in a civil war situation. Scholars, prominent among 
whom are James Rosenau (1968, 1974) and Evan Luard (1972), who studied intervention as an aspect of 
international relations have identified three types of intervention and the problems entailed in each. The first is 
one in which a power directly occupies the territory of another state to safeguard the regime from collapse. (For 
example, the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Russia in 1968). The second type of intervention is one in which 
one government finances rebel forces to overthrow another legitimate government because of the intervening 
powers opposition to the ideological orientation of the country being intervened in. American interventionist aid 
to Jonas Savimbi’s group against the popular movement for the liberation of Angola (MPLA) has been cited as 
an example of this. 
The last type of intervention is where a power sells arms to the force of either side in a civil strife. The 
powers that supplied military assistance to either the federal military government of Nigeria or Biafra falls under 
this category. In the resolution of conflict in this kind of intervention, a number of conditions are necessary. 
Firstly, the country being intervened in by other countries must be in a relatively weak military state. This 
condition was present in Nigeria where Nigeria’s military strength in 1966 was only a constabulary force of 
about 20,000 men (Akinbi, 1991). Thus by implication, as at 1967, Nigeria not to talk of Biafra was not in a 
position to fight a major protracted war. (obviously, with the lack of external sources of arms, both parties would 
see the futility of an armed encounter). 
Secondly, there must be in existence extra-state organisations capable of mediation in the civil strife. 
As regards the Nigerian war, there were three such organisations – the O.A.U, U.N.O and the Commonwealth of 
Nations. However, it is worthy of note that there is a clause about respect for the political independence and non 
– interference in the internal affairs of member states in their charter which prevented them from taking concrete 
action to resolve the Nigerian war (Ajibola, 1978). 
The last condition which is the most important to the Nigerian war was the readiness by the 
intervening powers to stop arms sale when it might be effective. This condition would have been possible in 
Nigeria by July 1968 when all the countries that were supplying arms, either stopped arms supply or indicated 
their willingness to ban arms sales to both parties in the Nigerian war. Russia and Britain were the only two 
countries that neither banned nor showed any willingness to stop arms supply to Nigeria (Jorre, 1972). 
The reasons for this action on the part of Britain and Russia as well as its implications shall later be 
examined in the cause of this study under the concluding remarks. We shall now proceed to examining the 
intervention of Britain and Russia during the Nigerian civil war.   
 
3. Great Britain and the Nigerian Civil War 
At the outbreak of the Nigerian war Britain found itself in a quandary, this is because Biafra’s secession 
constituted a number of problems for Britain. On the one hand, it was a truism that Britain was Nigeria’s former 
imperial master, and since independence Nigeria had been an active member of the commonwealth. If she 
(Britain) supported secession, she might be accused of trying to dismember Nigeria. On the other hand, if she 
supported the federal government there might be a moral dilemma as to whether territorial integrity should be 
upheld by arms supplies especially since all the people of Nigeria (Biafra included) were supposed to be in the 
same relation to Britain.(Ajibola, 1978). This moral dilemma was further exacerbated by the events in Nigeria 
leading to secession. Moreover, Britain citizens and investments were on both sides of the conflict. Finally, there 
was the question of oil royalty. Britain needed to decide which side to pay the oil royalty to.  
The question became imperative as Britain regarded safeguarding her source of oil as important. This 
fear of loss of oil was also aggravated by the situation in the Middle East. Egypt closed the Suez canal on June 6, 
1967 and thereby reduced the source of British oil supply. Thus initially, as Britain dithered and was watching 
intently to see which way the winds would blow, she declared that she was ‘neutral’. (Jorre, 1972) Britain later 
declared open support for the federal government because of some reasons. 
The first motive for British intervention in Nigeria was dictated by the urge to protect  her economic 
interests in Nigeria. The magnitude of British economic interests in Nigeria can be seen from the estimate by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria in 1965, putting the total investment of British Companies at $568 million which was 53 
percent of all foreign investment in Nigeria. (Cervenka, 1971). There was the argument by Uwechue (1971) that 
Britain’s economic interest could flourish as well in a divided Nigeria as they did in a united country. For 
instance Ralph Uwechue cited the examples that ‘Britain split colonial India’ before quitting her but continued to 
maintain practically unabated economic ties with both India and Pakistan after the event. So also was her 
relations with Malaya and Singapore after the dissolution of the Malayan Federation. (Uwechue, 1971). 
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According to (Akinbi 1991), though this might be true, there is no gainsaying the fact that a single unit 
is usually economically preferable to multiple units. Besides, the above contention can only hold water if only 
the country broke up in a peaceful and amicable atmosphere. But the Nigerian civil war provided a sharp contrast 
to peaceful division. in fact any ill – conceived step by Britain could have far – reaching implications for her 
relations in a divided Nigeria. It was no wonder then that Britain fell behind the side with the ‘big’ battalions. It 
is also noteworthy that for Britain, national interest had to take into account the attitudes of major African 
countries. Since Britain still had black Africa on its back as a result of Rhodesia’s illegal breakaway, supporting 
Lagos provided her the opportunity to redress the balance by conveniently keeping in step with the O.A.U and 
the majority of African nations. 
Another reason that changed Britain’s ambivalence to open support for the federal government was the 
belief of Britain that Biafra would collapse rapidly. In other words, Britain undermined the will of the Ibos and 
their potential strength to resist Lagos, believing that the rebellion would be easily crushed. The British’s 
conclusion was reinforced not only by the fact of federal victory over Biafra when the battle of Ore was fought 
in September 1968 but also by the fact that initially, Gowon himself called it a ‘police’ action and predicted 
Biafra’s collapse in a matter of weeks – which never materialised. 
Finally, Britain’s hands were forced by Russia’s willingness to supply arms to the federal government 
coupled with the diplomatic manoeuvres of Anthony Enahoro. When Britain refused to sell arms to Nigeria, the 
Nigerians therefore turned to Russia. A cultural agreement and technical assistance treaties that encompassed the 
supply of arms were signed on July 1967. After this Chief Enahoro visited London and reminded the British 
Prime Minister – Harold Wilson, that British trade investments in Nigeria were important, and that refusal to 
supply arms would amount to a betrayal at a crucial moment of need. All these factors combined to influence 
Britain to back Lagos not only diplomatically but also materially. 
During the course of the war, especially in 1968, the issue of whether arms supply would not continue 
to aggravate loss of lives aroused the international community. In other words from mid – 1968, a great majority 
of people started to feel that the war might not be won so easily as predicted by the federal government and an 
arms embargo would be decisively significant in ensuring the  peaceful resolution of the conflict. Thus between 
May and July 1968, according to (Jorre (1972), Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, France, Belgium and Italy 
banned the supply of arms to either side in the war. Only Britain and Russia refused to stop arms supply. 
Accounting for this British stand, Cronje (1972) quoted Sir Alec Douglas as having said in 1968 that “Britain is 
always asked to make a gesture and no one else follows suit, and that does not make much contribution to 
peace”. Despite this argument, countless efforts were expended to call for an arms embargo. (Akinyemi, 1978). 
Notwithstanding this, Britain was still intransigent as she did not stop the supply of arms. Some reasons have 
been advanced apart from Douglas’s argument about the sincerity of other countries to ensure the success of the 
international arms embargo, why arms supply continued against popular demand. According to Cronje (1972) 
the Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. George Thompson, argued that arms supply brought Britain 
enough influence so that Britain was able to moderate federal war efforts, though he did not elucidate the 
practical manifestation of this. Finally, Mr. Stewart, the foreign Secretary enunciated that Britain did not stop the 
supply of arms because there was no guarantee of a cease fire. He believed that an international arms embargo 
was inadequate to ensure peaceful resolution of the conflict and that it would aid the Biafrans at the end of the 
exercise.(Cronje, 1972). 
Rather than stop the supply of arms Britain believed that diplomatic means could be used to persuade 
the two sides to renounce war on their own. To this end, Britain exerted some efforts to persuade Biafra to 
surrender during the visits of Lord Shepherd to Nigeria in both September and December, 1968 (Jorre, 1972). Mr 
Foley was also delegated to meet Emperor Haile Selasaie, the chairman of O.A.U’s Consultative Committee on 
Nigeria and Diallo Telli, the O.A.U. Secretary General at approximately the same time with that of Lord 
Shepherd. 
But not surprisingly, all these diplomatic manoeuvres failed since the diplomatic efforts to be 
successful required an arms embargo which Britain found difficult to compromise. Because of Britain’s inability 
to stop the war through diplomacy of persuasion, arms supply increased. Between 1967 and 1969, arms imported 
to Nigeria were: 
Year Amount % total Arms 
1967 £171,391 47.84 
1968 £8,817,560 79.59 
1969 £10,255,089 97.36 
 Source: Nigeria Trade Summary, 1969. 
Thus by the beginning of 1969, when all diplomatic means too stop the  war foundered, Britain lost a 
good opportunity to use her influence to stop arms supply. 
There has been heated debate among writers about the rightness or otherwise of British arms policy 
which should be looked into. Cronje (1972) has argued that though Britain claimed that she supplied arms 
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because she wanted to see that the war efforts of the federal government were moderated, that reason was a 
façade. She advanced some reasons for this. Firstly, after August 1968, all that interested Britain was Nigeria’s 
victory and that Britain merely used words that suggested altruism so that she would be able to cover up the fact 
that by September 1968, she already has a vested interest in the outcome of the war, and Britain’s vest economic 
investment would be better protected under a single central authority. Cronje demonstrated this by the role 
played by Britain during the arrival of the international observer team in Nigeria between September and 
November, 1968. The duty was to investigate the argument propounded by the Ojukwu regime that genocide 
was taking place in Biafra. The composition of the Observer team was tactfully influenced by Britain to the 
extent that majority of the members were military men whom Cronje believes would have sympathy for soldiers 
rather than civilians. Also, the members of the team went round at the expense of the federal government. The 
aftermath of this was that the federal government was able to influence the report of the team. Thus, it was 
hardly a surprise that the team reported in London in 1969 that Biafra’s allegation of genocide was groundless 
(Wangh and Cronje, 1972). 
However, Dudley (1972) disagrees with Cronje. He stated that: “while, however, the Soviet Union 
sought to uses its  status as an arms supplier to secure economic advantages from the federal  government, 
Britain used her influence to influence the war policy of the federal government. Among the evidence he cited 
were that Britain persuaded the federal government to accept an international observer team and to permit the 
efforts of relief agencies operating in rebel-held areas. Furthermore, Britain demanded an assurance that federal 
troops would not be allowed to move into Ibo heartland. All these steps went a long way to reduce the loss of 
lives involved in the war and on this ground he concluded that Britain policy rather than being opportunistic was 
realistic and humanitarian in character.    
According to Akinbi (1991) from whatever angle one looks at the above two arguments, the fact is 
transparent that Britain could not be disinterested in the Nigerian Civil war. Nonetheless, she had genuine 
interests in ensuring peaceful resolution of the conflict. The fact that Britain displayed a modicum of efforts by 
sending some representatives to Nigeria and Ethiopia about negotiation at least could be seen as a minimum 
interest of Britain to stop the war without bloodshed. On the other hand, Dudley’s argument appears apologetic 
as it does not  meticulously elicit the motivational basis of British intervention The general feeling in the western 
world was that Nigeria fell under Britain’s sphere of influence, therefore Nigeria is a British problem (Akinbi, 
1991). In support of this, Melbourne (1970) has argued that rather than lack of interest, America’s unwillingness 
to get involved was due to the feeling that British should be in a better position to answer on anything that occurs 
in Nigeria. And as shown above, Britain herself enjoyed the privilege that her relations with Nigeria ran through 
Nigeria’s colonial and post – colonial history. In view of that, she had interest in the resolution of the conflict. 
The main motive that propelled British intervention however was the protection of her economic interesst in 
Nigeria, since she believed that putting a stop to arms supply would only give the Russians influence to her own 
detriment.  
 
4. Russia and the Nigerian civil war 
As indicated earlier, Nigeria external relations with Russia up to 1966 were not very cordial. But the relations 
began to improve from 1967 and reached its apogee at the end of the war. To support this fact, the Permanent 
Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Abdul Aziz Atta announced on 6th January 1967 that Nigeria was prepared to 
sign a loan agreement with Russia, the first of its kind since 1960. An agreement to promote cultural cooperation 
was also signed by the two countries on March 28, 1967. Through this agreement, Nigerians were permitted to 
visit Russia and students were emboldened to take Soviet scholarships. Again, at the end of 1967. Russia that 
had earlier been allowed to open an embassy was now allowed to increase the numbers of staff in that embassy 
and to open other information agencies in the state capitals.  
It is worthy of note also that by the time relations between Nigeria and Russia were improving, 
Russia’s relations with other West African states were shrinking to a very low ebb as she lost a friend with the 
overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana, Guinea also became unreliable. Her influence was also sagging in East Africa 
as a result of Sino – Soviet rivalry (Scalapino, 1970). Thus support for Lagos provided her a golden opportunity 
to consolidate her rising influence. 
Due to the refusal of Britain at the outbreak of the war to sell arms, the federal government found 
refuge in Moscow, where a Nigeria delegation arranged with the Russians the sale of arms (to Nigeria) in August 
1967. But Moscow required Lagos to sell her cocoa in exchange for arms. This was to compensate for the lost of 
cocoa the Russians incurred after the fall of Nkrumah. The Russians demanded for seven thousand tons of cocoa 
which the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Company could not procure. When they kept pestering the Nigerians about 
this, cocoa export to Moscow started jumping up. From 1967 to 1970, cocoa export to Moscow was worth £2.2m 
in 1965, £3.7m in 1967, £5.4m in 1968 and £6.6m in 1069 (West Africa, 22/12/1970). 
Soviet support for Lagos became official in October, 1967 when Premier Kosygin sent a letter to 
Gowon expressing Soviet’s support for Gowon’s endeavours to maintain the unity of Nigeria. He reiterated what 
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he called “Soviet desire to ensure the necessary safeguards of developing countries from imperialist forces” 
(Cervenka, 1972). Not surprisingly henceforth, Russia increased arms supply to Lagos and intensified her 
activities among labour leaders. For instance, Russia subsidized the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC) at 
the rate of about £30,000 yearly (Cervenka, 1972). 
The decision to support the Federal Military Government of Nigeria was based on a realistic 
assessment of the situation, that is, on the assumption that the O.A.U would uphold Nigeria against Biafra and 
that Africa would resolutely oppose intervention by the United Nations. (Cervenka, 1972). From the political 
point of view, Moscow’s Support for Nigeria involved no risk at all, since even if the Biafran secession were 
successful, the government (Nigeria) would still continue to exist in Lagos. 
But what was enigmatic about Soviet policy was that from 1967 to 1969, the Russians did not bother 
about the ideological orientation of the Gowon regime, which was by no means socialist inclined. The Nigerian 
rapproachment with Moscow was instigated by the need to procure arms. This view could be backed by some 
actions taken by the Gowon regime. Firstly, in May 1968, Gowon issued Decree 21 which ordered all disputes to 
be submitted to arbitration. Strikes were also outlawed by this decree until such arbitration failed.  Also, Wahab 
Goodluck (General – Secretary of the Union Trading Company, African workers union) was arrested when he 
wanted to go to Khartoun to attend a conference of world Liberation Movements. Again, Dr. Tunji Otegbeye 
was arrested on his return from Moscow where he attended an International Workers Meeting on January 1969. 
Throughout the war, General Gowon even stated quite explicitly that “Nigerian development could be attained 
only by remaining in the system of World Capitalism.” (Solodovnikov, 1969) 
Kudryavtsev’s (1968) has argued that Russia intervened in the war because of her intention to protest 
Nigeria from imperialist machination (or to aid the anti – imperialist struggles against the western powers). 
However, this justification of Soviet policy suggests a groundless altruism. The anti – imperialist 
stance was neutralised by the fact that Soviet support for Lagos was based on increasing soviet trade and cultural 
agreements with Nigeria rather than the ideological orientation of the Gowon’s government (Akinbi, 1991). With 
more cocoa exports to Moscow the sum-total of which stood at £6.8m in 1969, more Soviet arms was guaranteed 
for use in Nigeria. At the same time Soviet military assistance to Nigeria rose to £19 million worth of material 
that included ammunition, naval equipment, boats, howitzers, ilyushin and MIGs (West Africa, 22/2/1970). 
The Soviet policy on the Nigerian conflict was also outlined in an article called “Test of Africa’s 
maturity” published in lzvestia on 11 October, 1968 which states that: 
 The principle of the right to self determination for  
 Nationalities to the point of secession is not an  
 absolute one, and it is wrong to believe that it should 
 be applied in all conditions. No, it is subordinated to 
  the tasks of class struggle and social liberation.  
Thus by implication, the Soviet Union did not see Biafra’s quest for secession in terms of the right for 
self – determination. What was primary to Russia was how the issue of secession would jeopardise her growing 
influence. But the fact that was suppressed by the above statements was that Russia’s support for Lagos was a 
necessary foreign policy option far from being a selfless exercise. (Akinbi, 1991). 
The above view can be buttressed by the fact that Russia had long changed from the path of exclusive 
commitment to World Revolution. What was more primary to Russia was the advancement of the Soviet State’s 
interest before the question of anti – imperialism. No wonder then that the idea of world revolution has greatly 
waned after the death of Lenin and the survival of the soviet state had dominated soviet foreign policy from 
Stalin to Kruschev even up to the contemporary times. It is in support of this argument that Northedge (1968) 
has declared that soviet policy was governed by the pursuit of national interest. While Russia therefore realised 
that Nigeria was undoubtedly in the capitalist camp, it conveniently ignored this and armed the federalists. Thus 
Russian policy in the civil war provides a good case material for understanding the contemporary dominance of 
pragmatism over ideology when foreign policy interests came first and ideological enthusiasms second rather 
than being in the reverse. (Akinbi 1991). As pointed out earlier, almost all other intervening countries either 
stopped or banned arms sale by June 1968, only Russia and Britain persisted. In this way, Russia contributed to 
the prolongation of the Nigerian war. (Akinbi 1991). 
She refused to stop arms supply because by that time her involvement has assumed the status of a 
“dignified competition” for influence with Britain in Nigeria. Besides, not only did she derive enormous 
monetary gains from the sale of arms, but more importantly her refusal to stop arms ensured for her influence 
which was of a key political significance (Akinbi,1991)  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has given a historical analysis of British and Russian intervention during the Nigerian civil war. 
Specifically, it has examined the motivational bases of British and Russian involvement in the war, the dynamics 
and levels of such involvement. Also, the refusal of Britain and Russia to comply with the call for international 
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arms embargo in 1968 (when all the countries that were supplying arms, either stopped arms supply or indicated 
their willingness to ban arms sales to both parties in the war) indirectly contributed to the prolongation of the 
Nigerian civil war. The compliance with the call for an arms embargo on the part of Britain and Russia would 
have been significant in facilitating a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This is because having lost both men 
and materials, both sides (in the Nigerian war) by 1968 would see the futility of the entire war Business.    
It is also very important to state that Biafra suffered great military reverses in 1968 and 1969 (Akinbi, 
1991). Had there been the imposition of an arms embargo, the stock of arms possessed by both parties would 
have been depleted, and since by then Lagos had already shown her superiority, Biafra would have had no option 
other than to surrender and state some few conditions for re – integration, at the instance of any of such 
organisation as the O.A.U or the Commonwealth of Nations. Britain and Russia were not willing to stop arms 
supply because of their selfish interests. The paper recommends that there should be readiness by the intervening 
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